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I. INTRODUCTION
In Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court faced
the challenge of determining whether a Minnesota vehicle forfeiture statute 2
violated due process in light of an eighteen-month delay between the seizure
of a vehicle and the post-seizure hearing. 3 Megan Olson, a repeat drivingwhile-impaired (DWI) offender and the daughter of Helen Olson, was
driving her mother’s car when she was arrested for a fourth DWI offense. 4
This resulted in the seizure of the vehicle, despite the fact that the driver
was not the owner.
Minnesota’s forfeiture statute required that Megan’s pending criminal
proceeding be resolved before the forfeiture action could begin, 5 which
contributed to the eighteen-month delay. The court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute on its face and as applied to Megan, the nonowner driver. 6 However, the majority ruled that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Helen, the alleged innocent owner of the
vehicle. 7 The court reached its decision by applying the analytical test from
Mathews v. Eldridge, 8 which concerned process before the termination of
Social Security disability benefits, rather than Barker v. Wingo, 9 which
involved the constitutionality of a delay prior to a criminal trial.

*Kathryn Simunic is a J.D. Candidate, expected to graduate in 2021 from the Mitchell
Hamline School of Law. Kathryn would like to thank Professor Marie Failinger for providing
guidance on this case note. She would also like to express her gratitude to her husband,
Roko, for his unconditional support.
1
924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019).
2
MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d) (2018).
3
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602.
4
Id. at 598.
5
MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d).
6
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 616.
7
8
9

Id.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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This case note begins with a discussion of the judiciary’s controversial
efforts to navigate the complexities of the variable and unpredictable
procedural due process doctrine. 10 A brief overview of procedural due
process in the context of civil forfeiture follows, with an explanation of the
commonalities between civil forfeiture and criminal law. 11 The use of the
Mathews framework and Barker factors in procedural due process,
specifically in Minnesota, are also discussed. 12 Next, the facts and procedural
history of Olson follow, 13 along with an explanation of the majority’s
decision. 14
This note then continues with an analysis of the constitutional test
employed in Olson, 15 arguing that the use of the Barker factors would have
been more appropriate because of the quasi-criminal nature of civil
forfeiture along with the United States Supreme Court’s application of
Barker for this specific forfeiture issue. 16 The note goes on to examine the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in applying the Mathews
framework—because of the court’s desire to follow Minnesota precedent—
and disregarding the differences between private property and
administrative benefits. 17 Subsequently, the note argues that Olson, if
decided under the Barker factors, would likely have held the forfeiture
statute constitutional as applied to both Megan and Helen. 18 This result is
then compared with the outcome for innocent owners generally, arguing
that Barker provides a stronger claim for these individuals. 19 Finally, this case
note concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Olson ruling on
future cases in Minnesota. 20

10

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
12
See infra Section II.C.
13
See infra Section III.A.
14
See infra Section III.B.
15
See infra Part IV.
16
See infra Section IV.A.
17
See infra Section IV.B.
18
See infra Section IV.C.
19
See id.
20
See infra Section IV.D.
11
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II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW

A. Origin and Evolution of Procedural Due Process
The roots of due process trace back to the Magna Carta of 1215. 21
Originating from English law, due process aimed to protect individuals from
the unrestrained power of the King. 22 The notorious Clause 39 stated, “No
free man shall be . . . stripped of his rights or possessions . . . except by the
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.” 23 Almost 600 years
later, the Framers sought to replicate these rights by carefully constructing
this language in a more simplistic form. 24 The due process protections are
embedded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution to ensure fair procedures are in place to prevent the arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government. 25 The underlying
premise of the procedural due process doctrine is “‘the opportunity to be
heard’ . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 26
Since their inception within the Bill of Rights, these seemingly
simplified clauses have proven to be increasingly complex in the eyes of the

21

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378–79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the
original concept of due process found in the Magna Carta); see also Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (noting that “due process of law”
and “law of the land” are synonymous); W. J. Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in
American Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL L. REV. 561 (1954).
22
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889) (“[Due process of law] come[s] to us from
the law of England, from which country our jurisprudence is to a great extent derived; and
their requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the
crown, and place him under the protection of the law.”); see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The
Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 327–50 (2016) (discussing the events
leading up to the creation of the Magna Carta, its impact on English Law, and its influence
on developing American constitutional law).
23
English Translation of Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBRARY (July 28, 2014),
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation
[https://
perma.cc/6XB8-Z9FF].
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–33 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing
the influence of Clause 39 on the Framers in enacting the Due Process Clause); see also
Leonard W. Klingen, Our Due Process Debt to Magna Carta, 90 FLA. B.J., 16, 18 (2016)
(“It is a testament to their genius that the framers’ more economical use of language did
nothing to narrow the reach of the protections thus afforded.”).
25
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
26
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914)).
24
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courts. 27 Aside from acknowledging that due process is an individual right,
the clauses are rather vague and lack detail as to what guarantees are
specifically afforded. 28 In the absence of explicit guidance, courts have relied
on the concept of fundamental fairness to resolve the ambiguities and
further develop the doctrine. 29 Given its ambiguous nature, due process
demands a fact-specific analysis for each individual case. 30
Typically, courts begin a due process analysis by assessing whether the
liberty or property interest at issue falls within the protections of due
process. 31 Prior to the 1970s, government benefits were not considered
protected interests under this analysis. 32 However, with the expansion of
27

See Larkin, supra note 22, at 296 (suggesting that the ambiguous language of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments has led to continual interpretations by the judiciary, specifically in
unraveling the meaning of the terms “depriving,” “person,” “liberty,” and “property”).
See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) (“‘Due process’ is an elusive concept. Its
exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual
contexts.”); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) (“[I]t may be difficult, if not
impossible, to give to the terms ‘due process of law’ a definition which will embrace every
permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as are forbidden.”).
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981) (“Applying the Due
Process Clause is . . . an uncertain enterprise which must discover what
‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly
between the individual and government, ‘due process’ is compounded of history, reason,
the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith
which we profess.”); Kelley v. Alamo, 964 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1992); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 892 (11th Cir. 1985); Barlau v. Northfield, 568 F. Supp. 181, 188 (D.
Minn. 1983).
30
See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Cafeteria
Workers & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“[D]ue
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances.”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the ever-changing nature of due
process and its ability to adapt to the demands of society).
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1717–19 (1975) (explaining the privileges that typically did not receive due
process protections as well as providing examples of interests that are now recognized under
due process expansion); Sara B. Tosdal, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 1003, 1010–12 (2011) (comparing the approaches taken by the United States Supreme
Court in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy and Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth to demonstrate the analysis of the Court).
32
See Randy Lee, Twenty-Five Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling from the Right Spot
on the Wrong Road to the Wrong Place, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 863, 867 (1994) (noting that
benefit payments and employment from the government were not protected under due
28

29

31
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administrative agencies following the New Deal, due process concerns
regarding the fairness of administrative proceedings were on the rise. 33 The
growing prevalence of these cases gave way to the landmark decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 34 where the United States Supreme Court enforced due
process rights in the context of administrative proceedings. 35
In Goldberg, procedural due process protections were expanded to
include a new form of property interest: welfare benefits. 36 The petitioners
in Goldberg received financial aid through federal and New York State
assistance programs. 37 The aid, however, was terminated without prior
notice or an evidentiary hearing. 38 After the suit had commenced, New York
developed procedures for providing notice and a hearing. 39 The Court,
accordingly, considered two issues: (1) whether notice and a hearing are
required prior to the termination of welfare benefits and (2) whether the
State’s revised procedures satisfied due process. 40
First, the Court weighed the individual’s need for welfare assistance
against the government’s concern of protecting public funds. 41 The Court
reasoned that the stakes were much higher for an eligible individual, who
would likely be impoverished without the federal aid. 42 This vital individual
need substantially outweighed the government’s interest. 43 Moreover, Justice
Brennan stated that “[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements
as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’” 44 Thus, terminating these statutory

process in the era prior to Goldberg v. Kelly); see also Stewart, supra note 31, at 1717–19
(explaining the privileges that typically did not receive due process protections and providing
examples of interests that are now recognized under due process expansion).
33
See Tosdal, supra note 31, at 1007 (discussing the history of administrative law and the
agencies born from the New Deal, specifically the Social Security Administration and the
National Labor Relations Board).
34
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
35
Id. at 263–64.
36
See id. at 261–62; see also Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1063 (1984), (noting that the decision in Goldberg resulted in the
expansion of procedural due process to a wide array of government benefits that had not
previously been recognized as protected property).
37
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256.
38

Id.
Id. at 257.
40
Id. at 256–57.
41
Id. at 261.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 262 n.8; see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)
39

(discussing the rights-privileges distinction and branding government benefits as “new
property” because of their comparable economic importance to personal property).
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entitlements—a now-protected interest—without an evidentiary hearing
would deprive individuals of their property without due process. 45
Second, the majority assessed New York’s new procedures to
determine what process is due in terminating welfare benefits. 46 It
recognized that due process “require[d] that a recipient have timely and
adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.” 47 The Court quickly
glossed over the seven-day notice outlined by the State’s procedures but
acknowledged that the recipient’s inability to present evidence orally or
question an adverse witness resulted in insufficient due process. 48
As the doctrine evolved, courts continued to develop various
frameworks and analytical tools to assess due process violations. Goldberg
had weighed private interests against governmental interests. 49 This
balancing test laid the foundation for the framework established in Mathews
v. Eldridge. 50 In Mathews, the petitioner’s Social Security disability benefits
had been terminated without a prior evidentiary hearing. 51 Given that the
facts of Mathews had a striking resemblance to Goldberg, the Court applied
the Goldberg test but identified a third prong. 52 To determine whether due
process required an evidentiary hearing before terminating disability
payments, the Court balanced three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 53
45

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
Id.
47
Id. at 267–68.
48
Id. at 268.
49
Id. at 261. This analysis created the basis of the Mathews test. See Lee, supra note 32, at
46

884–87 (discussing the motivations behind Justice Brennan’s omission of the probability of
erroneous deprivation prong that the district court had originally included in its analysis).
50
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
51
Id. at 320.
52
Id. at 335; see also Lee, supra note 32, at 977–78 (noting that the Court reverted to the
original test from the district court in Goldberg, which was not criticized in Justice Brennan’s
dissenting opinion).
53
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263–71). Although Goldberg did
not explicitly include the second factor from Mathews, the Goldberg Court expressed similar
concerns about the risk of erroneous deprivation. Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266
(“[T]he stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest
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The Court distinguished the hardship faced in the deprivation of
welfare benefits from that caused by the loss of disability benefits to reach
its conclusion that a pre-termination hearing was not required in this case. 54
Since this decision, the Mathews framework has been extended to a wide
array of cases involving various procedural due process violations. 55
Prior to its decision in Mathews, the Court had also developed a set
of factors in Barker v. Wingo 56 to evaluate whether a delay of more than five
years violated the defendant’s due process right to a speedy trial. 57 The
Barker test considers: “[1.] [l]ength of the delay, [2.] the reason for the delay,
[3.] the defendant’s assertion of his right, and [4.] prejudice to the
defendant.” 58
In addition to Sixth Amendment due process challenges, the Barker
test has been applied in the civil forfeiture context. 59 In particular, courts
have used these factors to assess the timing of forfeiture proceedings after
property is seized. 60 Even though Barker has been extended to civil
forfeiture, 61 courts remain divided over the proper test for analyzing
error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the
recipient a chance, . . . , to be fully informed of the case against him . . . .”), with Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335.
54
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340–41.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (invalidating the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 for inadequate process for the detention of enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (finding that the
government’s process for placement in supermax prison provided acceptable due process);
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 24 (1991) (holding that the statute providing prejudgment
attachment without notice or a hearing constituted a procedural due process violation). See
generally Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge
Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2010) (discussing that the Mathews test has
been widely used by the Supreme Court for numerous areas of due process).
56
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
57
Id. at 514.
58
Id. at 530.
Teresia B. Jovanovic, Annotation, Delay Between Seizure of Personal Property by Federal
55

59

Government and Institution of Proceedings for Forfeiture Thereof as Violative of Fifth
Amendment Due Process Requirements, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 373, § 2 (1984) (“As a general
proposition, any delay between the seizure of personal property by federal governmental
officials and the institution of proceedings for forfeiture thereof, which is substantial,
unexcused, and unreasonable in view of the circumstances presented, will bar further
forfeiture proceedings on due process grounds.”).
See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 2382 (2019) (indicating that the Barker factors supply
the appropriate test for evaluating procedural due process requirements specific to timeliness
and delays in forfeiture proceedings); see also United States v. $23,407.69 in U.S. Currency,
715 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Piteo, 726 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir. 1983).
61
See, e.g., United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (applying Barker’s four-factor balancing test to determine
60
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procedural due process in this context. 62 Many courts continue to consider
Mathews to be the more suitable framework because of its ability to
encompass a broad scope of procedural due process issues. 63

B. Overview of Procedural Due Process in Civil Forfeiture
Like procedural due process, civil forfeiture has a long-standing
history in English common law. 64 Civil forfeiture often includes the
deprivation of property from an owner who used it to facilitate a crime, or
assisted others in committing a crime intentionally or negligently. 65 Deeprooted precedent established that the property is guilty of the crime rather

that there was no unreasonable delay in filing a forfeiture action); United States v. One 1976
Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F.2d 1171 (1982); United States v. One 1978 Cadillac Sedan De
Ville, 490 F. Supp. 725 (1980); United States v. One 1973 Ford LTD, Serial. No.
3J66S132017, 409 F. Supp. 741 (1976).
62
See Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 60 (2d Cir. 2002) (employing Mathews to evaluate
the requirement for a prompt post-seizure hearing of a vehicle). But see United States v. Two
Hundred Ninety-Five Ivory Carvings, 726 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to uphold
the district court’s decision that due process was violated by the government’s nineteenmonth delay in initiating civil forfeiture proceedings because the Barker factors had not been
evaluated).
63
See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993); Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979); Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles,
648 F.3d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 2011); Chernin v. Welchans, 844 F.2d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 1988);
McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1985); Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN
License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X007961, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019).
64
See Michele M. Jochner, From Fiction to Fact: The Supreme Court’s Re-evaluation of
Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, 82 ILL. B.J. 560, 561 (1994) (noting that legal historians have
found origins of civil forfeiture in the Bible); see also Jacob M. Hilton, Keep Him on a Short

Leash: Innocence of Owner Not a Constitutional Defense to Forfeiture of Property Allegedly
Connected to Illegal Conduct: Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996), 28 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 133, 135–36 (1997) (explaining the three types of forfeiture under English common
law: deodand, forfeiture upon conviction of felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture, and
that the United States only adopted statutory forfeiture, which had primarily been used in
connection with customs and revenue laws violations).
See Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining civil forfeiture as “[a]n
in rem proceeding brought by the government against property that either facilitated a crime
or was acquired as a result of criminal activity”); see also Mary M. Cheh, Can Something
65

This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the
Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (explaining the modern characteristics of
civil forfeitures).
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than the property owner. 66 This has commonly become known as the
“guilty-property fiction.” 67
As opposed to criminal proceedings against an individual, civil
forfeiture acts in rem against the property itself. 68 Pursuing these proceedings
in rem means that they are usually civil as opposed to criminal. 69 Such
proceedings remain highly controversial because civil claimants are afforded
fewer constitutional protections than criminal defendants, including the lack
of a right to a jury trial and a lower standard of proof. 70
Additionally, certain circumstances allow in rem proceedings to
commence without the typical minimum due process requirements of prior
notice and a hearing. For example, the Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 71
recognized that various “‘extraordinary situations’ . . . justify postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing.” 72 It indicated that each of these
instances met a common set of conditions:
First, . . . the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an
important governmental
or general public interest. Second,
there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, . . .
the person initiating the seizure has been a government official
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly
drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular
instance. 73
Thus, in some situations, the very link between forfeiture and criminal
activity can serve as the basis for the government’s ability to seize property.
While civil forfeiture had long existed as a sanction in common law,
its use was relatively rare until the 1970s with the passage of the Racketeer
See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (“[T]he
thing is primarily considered the offender.”); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 233
(1844) (“The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty
instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the
character or conduct of the owner.”); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (1827) (“The thing is here
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the
thing.”).
67
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 616 (1993).
68
36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 1 (2019).
69
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017).
70
Id. at 847–48; David J. Stone, The Opportunity of Austin v. United States: Toward a
Functional Approach to Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 427,
434–35 (1993) (criticizing the fact that forfeiture proceedings are classified as civil as opposed
to criminal because of the fewer of constitutional protections that are afforded to civil
litigants).
71
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
72
Id. at 90.
73
Id. at 91.
66
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA). 74 These acts were passed in an effort to curtail illegal
activity arising from criminal enterprises, and they allowed property of
criminal organizations to be forfeited. 75 However, the increasing prevalence
of civil forfeiture led to heightened scrutiny in order to manage the risk of
abuse. In particular, with the close connection between civil forfeiture and
criminal activity, courts have noted the danger of prejudice based on the
timing of civil forfeiture proceedings prior to the conclusion of a related
criminal matter. 76 In those instances, the defense of a civil forfeiture
proceeding may place the subsequent criminal proceedings in jeopardy. 77
Thus, courts have held that postponing forfeiture proceedings until the
resolution of related criminal proceedings is warranted in certain
circumstances. 78
Despite its intended remedial purpose, 79 civil forfeiture has been
regarded as a quasi-criminal punishment due to its punitive impact and
74
75
76

See Stone, supra note 70, at 427–28 (discussing the development of civil forfeiture).
Id.

United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency,
461 U.S. 555, 567 (1983) (citing United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1980))
(“In some circumstances, a civil forfeiture proceeding would prejudice the claimant’s ability
to raise an inconsistent defense in a contemporaneous criminal proceeding.”); United States
v. One 1976 Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1982) (“Had the government
pursued forfeiture at the same time, it is probable that [the defendant] would have claimed
that his defense in the criminal case was being prejudiced.”).
Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Pendency of Criminal Prosecution as Ground for
77

Continuance or Postponement of Civil Action to Which Government is Party Involving
Facts or Transactions Upon Which Prosecution is Predicted-Federal Cases, 33 A.L.R. FED.
2d 111, § 2 (2009) (“Parties facing parallel civil and criminal proceedings are in an unenviable
position, primarily since the scope of civil discovery is so much broader than that in the
criminal realm. A party's defense of civil claims may thus threaten the Fifth Amendment
privilege, particularly vis-a-vis testimony that would impact the criminal proceedings.
Accordingly, courts have held that the pendency of parallel or related criminal proceedings
may provide a basis for postponing the civil proceeding under certain conditions.”).
78
See, e.g., United States. v. Any and All Assets of Shane Co., 147 F.R.D. 99, 102 (M.D.N.C.
1992) (granting a short stay of discovery in a civil forfeiture proceeding) (“Under the
circumstances where the criminal investigation is pending and prior to indictment, and where
claimants will not be able to fully provide discovery answers, the Court is less inclined to
permit discovery or to allow partial discovery.”); United States v. One 1964 Cadillac Coupe
DeVille, 41 F.R.D. 352, 354–55 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (explaining that the information in a
claimant’s interrogatories in a civil forfeiture case was of “paramount importance” in the
pending criminal action, which justified a stay of discovery until the criminal action was
resolved).
79
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (quoting United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)) (“[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
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focus on deterrence. 80 In 1974, this focus on a punitive and deterrent
purpose guided the Court in reaching its decision in Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 81 There, the Court held that seizing a lessee’s
yacht upon finding marijuana without providing prior notice or a hearing
advanced the criminal statute’s purpose “by preventing further illicit use of
the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering
illegal behavior unprofitable.” 82 The yacht’s lessor attempted to assert an
innocent-owner defense to demonstrate that the lack of process prior to
seizure violated his due process rights. 83 The Court, however, found
insufficient evidence that the lessor had done everything reasonably possible
to prevent the unlawful behavior conducted on his property. 84
The dismissal of due process claims in forfeiture by innocent owners
was not unprecedented 85 as it had been supported by caselaw dating back as
early as 1827. 86 The justification for forfeiting the property of an innocent
owner was, essentially, negligence—“that the owner may be held accountable
for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his property.” 87 The Court,
however, has implied that it may be possible for a “truly” innocent owner,

remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.”).
See United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Civil
forfeiture statutes, although not sufficiently criminal to trigger the full array of constitutional
protections, are nonetheless considered ‘quasi-criminal’ and implicate certain constitutional
rights.”); 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 3 (2019) (“Forfeiture serves not only remedial purpose, but
also retributive or punitive, and deterrent, purposes.”); see also Cheh, supra note 65, at 16–
17 (discussing the punitive impact of civil forfeiture, particularly for forfeiture of property
used as a criminal instrument in which “punishment is imposed in addition to any criminal
penalties and is wholly unrelated to whether criminal charges could be or were brought”).
81
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
82
Id. at 686–87.
83
Id. at 680.
84
Id. at 690.
85
See, e.g., J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) (finding that
a carriage that was used in the removal or concealment of goods removed with intent to
defraud the United States must be forfeited); Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
395 (1877) (subjecting the owner of a distillery property to forfeiture for the owner’s intent
to defraud the United States of revenue); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844)
(holding that the vessel committing the aggression is the guilty instrument and implying that
forfeiture attached to it despite the character or conduct of the owner).
86
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827) (holding that personal conviction of the offender is not
necessary to enforce a forfeiture).
87
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615 (1993).
80
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who did not have knowledge of the criminal activity and did not consent to
it, to succeed in this defense. 88

C. Procedural Due Process in Minnesota
The Minnesota Constitution contains a clause to prevent the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process. 89 Among these
protections are reasonable notice and a timely opportunity to be heard. 90
However, the promptness of a hearing is not limited to a certain time
frame. 91 The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Mathews
framework on numerous occasions when faced with a variety of procedural
due process challenges. 92 This is fitting because Mathews was designed to
assess the general constitutionality of process. These cases involve process
challenges for different types of proceedings, such as, child support, 93 license
revocations, 94 and parole release. 95

88

Calero, 416 U.S. at 689–90 (“It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to
reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been
taken from him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an owner
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served
legitimate purpose and was not unduly oppressive.”); see also Austin, 509 U.S. at 617.
89
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
90
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
91
7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.17 (2019) (citing Mixed Local of
Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union Local No. 458 v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. Int’l All., 212 Minn. 587,
597, 4 N.W.2d 771, 777 (Minn. 1942)) (“Notice and hearing are indispensable requirements
of due process, but there is no requirement that the same be afforded at any particular stage
of the proceedings.”).
See, e.g., Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN:
JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594, 603 (Minn. 2019); Gams v. Houghton, 884
N.W.2d 611, 619 (Minn. 2016) (employing Mathews to assess the process related to the
involuntary dismissal of a personal injury action); Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785–
86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews to review the extension of an order for protection for
potential violations of procedural due process); State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 568
(Minn. 2007) (evaluating procedural due process rights concerning judicial review of a
driver’s license revocation with Mathews); Martin v. Itasca County, 448 N.W.2d 368, 370
(Minn. 1989) (utilizing Mathews to examine an employer’s leave of absence policy for a
procedural due process violation); Machacek v. Voss, 361 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. 1985)
(analyzing a statute requiring the temporary payment of child support based upon blood test
results in paternity proceedings with Mathews).
Machacek, 361 N.W.2d at 863.
Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1983).
State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1978).
92

93
94
95
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On the other hand, Minnesota recognizes that the Barker factors apply
to delays in access to courts, specifically to the delay in instituting a postseizure forfeiture action violating the due process clause. 96 Barker, however,
has not been applied to delays in the forfeiture context. The Minnesota
Supreme Court had not encountered this particular issue until Olson. The
only cases to date to incorporate Barker involved the right to a speedy trial. 97
Rather than stray from its precedent of broadly applying Mathews, the
Minnesota Supreme Court continued to utilize this test, including in the
quasi-criminal context of forfeiture. 98
III. THE OLSON DECISION

A. Facts and Procedural History
On August 16, 2015, a Shakopee police officer observed Megan
Olson driving under the influence of alcohol. 99 After conducting a breath
test that confirmed Megan was intoxicated, the officer arrested her for
driving while impaired. 100 This was not Megan’s first encounter with DWIs.
In fact, at the time of her arrest, she had already been convicted of three
previous DWIs within the last decade. 101 Because of her prior DWI
incidents in the last ten years, Megan was charged with two counts of felony
first-degree DWI. 102
Under the Minnesota vehicle forfeiture statute, 103 a vehicle is subject
to forfeiture when used to commit a “designated offense.” 104 First-degree
DWI offenses fall within the category of a designated offense. 105 As a result,
the 1999 Lexus that Megan was driving was seized, despite the fact that she
was not the vehicle’s owner. 106 Megan was the only driver of the Lexus, 107 but
her mother, Helen Olson, was the sole registered owner. 108 Minnesota law
96

7 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.23 (2019).
See, e.g., State v. Gayles, 327 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1982); State v. Terry, 295 N.W.2d 95
(Minn. 1980).
98
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 603 (Minn. 2019).
99
Id. at 598.
100
Id. at 610.
101
Id. at 598.
102
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN, 910 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
103
MINN. STAT. § 169A.63 (2018).
104
Id. § 169A.63, subdiv. 6(a).
105
Id. § 169A.63, subdiv. 1(e)(1).
106
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 598.
107
Id. at 609.
108
Id. at 598.
97
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provides that a vehicle may be seized incident to the lawful arrest of an
individual suspected of committing a designated offense, 109 but an interested
party may file a demand for judicial determination to contest the seizure. 110
Even though Helen was not driving her vehicle, it was seized nonetheless
because it was used to facilitate the commission of a designated offense. 111
As a result, both Megan and Helen were served notice of the seizure and
intent to forfeit. 112
Once an individual makes a demand for a judicial determination,
subdivision 9(d) requires a hearing to be “held at the earliest practicable
date, and in any event no later than 180 days following the filing of the
demand by the claimant.” 113 However, this 180-day rule is subject to
subdivision 9(d), which states that “[i]f a related criminal proceeding is
pending, the hearing shall not be held until the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings.” 114 Additionally, it specifies that the hearing must be scheduled
“as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the criminal prosecution.” 115
The statute does not provide further guidance on the length of time that is
considered to be “as soon as practicable.” 116
Given that an owner is deprived of personal property, the statute
provides three methods of reducing the hardship of deprivation. 117 First, an
owner may post a bond for the value of the vehicle and have it returned with
a temporary disabling device. 118 Second, a person with an interest in the
forfeited property can file a petition for remission or mitigation of the
forfeiture with the county prosecutor, who determines whether the
forfeiture may reasonably be remitted or mitigated. 119 Finally, the statute
provides an innocent-owner defense. 120 This defense allows owners who do
not have actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful use of their
property to petition the court, although family members are presumed to
have this knowledge. 121

109
110

MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdivs. 2(b), 6(a) (2018).

Id. subdivs. 8(e)–(f).
111
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 610.
112
Id. at 598.
113
114

MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d) (2018).

Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599.
118
119

MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 4 (2018).

Id. subdiv. 5(a).
120
Id. subdiv. 7(d).
121
Id.
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On October 7, 2015, Megan and Helen Olson filed a joint demand
for judicial determination of the forfeiture, claiming that the statute violated
their constitutional due process rights. 122 A hearing was then scheduled for
February 11, 2016. 123 However, as required by the forfeiture statute, 124 the
hearing was continued six times due to Megan’s pending criminal
proceedings. 125
Megan pleaded guilty to the first-degree DWI charge on October 12,
2016, approximately fourteen months from the date of her arrest. 126 Two
days later, Megan and Helen moved for summary judgment and argued that
subdivision 9(d) failed to provide a prompt forfeiture hearing. 127 On
February 23, 2017, approximately eighteen months after the seizure, the
forfeiture hearing took place. 128 The district court granted summary
judgment to the Olsons, holding that their procedural due process rights
were violated by the statute. 129
The State appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals found that the
forfeiture statute was constitutional on its face because the Olsons failed to
demonstrate that the statute would always be unconstitutional. 130 The court
reasoned that it is possible for a related criminal matter to be promptly
resolved, which would allow for a prompt forfeiture hearing. 131 However,
due to the statute’s caveat preventing a hearing until after Megan’s criminal
proceedings concluded, the court determined that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to both Megan and Helen. 132 It reasoned that the
statute failed to provide a mechanism for prompt, meaningful review. 133

122
123

Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599–600.

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN, 910 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9(d) (2018).
125
Olson, 910 N.W.2d at 74.
126
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600.
124

127

Id.
Id.
129
Id.
130
Olson, 910 N.W.2d at 77.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 80.
133
Id.
128
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B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the facial constitutionality
of subdivision 9(d). 134 It also upheld the unconstitutionality of the statute as
applied to Helen Olson, who claimed to be an innocent owner. 135 The court,
however, reversed the Minnesota Court of Appeal’s determination that the
forfeiture statute was unconstitutional as applied to Megan Olson, a
non-owner driver. 136 To reach this conclusion, the court’s first task was to
determine the appropriate framework for reviewing the procedural due
process claims presented. 137 The majority considered the factors established
in Barker, which involved the constitutionality of a delay leading up to a
criminal defendant’s trial. 138 However, the majority chose to apply the
framework developed in Mathews, a case pertaining to the process afforded
to individuals in the termination of government benefits. 139
First, the Olsons claimed that the forfeiture statute was facially
unconstitutional. 140 They argued that the delay caused by the requirement to
resolve criminal proceedings prior to a post-seizure hearing meant that no
demand for judicial determination could ever be constitutionally prompt. 141
Much like the court of appeals, the majority concluded that there could be
instances when the criminal proceedings are resolved quickly, which would
lead to a constitutionally prompt post-seizure hearing. 142 The majority
reasoned that if the court can identify even “a single situation in which the
[statute at issue] might be applied constitutionally, [a party’s] facial challenge
fails.” 143 Thus, the statute was not unconstitutional on its face. 144
Next, Megan’s as-applied due process challenge was reviewed. 145 In
applying the Mathews factors, the court found that Megan’s private interest
was limited. 146 Since she was not the registered owner of the vehicle, she did
not have an economic interest in selling or using the car as collateral. 147 Also,
134

Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 616.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 601.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 602–04.
140
Id. at 607.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 608.
143
Id. at 607 (quoting McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2013)).
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 609 (describing Megan’s sole interest as the potential that she “could ask family or
135

friends to use the vehicle to drive her to and from particular locations.”).

147

Id.
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Megan could not legally drive because her license had already been
cancelled. 148 Besides, the State had a compelling interest in curbing the risk
to public safety by keeping repeat DWI offenders off the road. 149
Additionally, requiring a hearing to be held within a very short window after
a seizure would significantly increase the administrative and fiscal burden
on the court system, given the substantial number of DWI-related vehicle
seizures each year. 150
Further, the risk of erroneous deprivation was not significant. 151 Under
section 169A.63, the vehicle could only be seized if Megan had committed
a designated offense. 152 The arresting officer had probable cause because the
breath test showed she was intoxicated, and she had a record with three
prior criminal offenses. 153 These factors established that the classification of
a designated offense was proper. 154 Given that Megan had a timely
preliminary judicial hearing regarding probable cause, the risk of erroneous
deprivation was not compelling. 155 The majority, therefore, ruled that the
forfeiture statute was constitutional as applied to Megan, the sole driver of
the vehicle. 156
Finally, the court addressed whether the forfeiture statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Helen. 157 The majority determined that
Helen’s private interest was greater than Megan’s interest. 158 Although
Helen’s driving license was also cancelled, the court found that the vehicle
was still a financial asset to her. 159 Additionally, the State’s interest was less
significant. 160 The State’s compelling interest in preventing DWI offenders
from getting behind the wheel was weaker since Helen was not driving while
impaired. 161 Moreover, the administrative and financial burdens would be
reduced if the requirement for a hearing shortly after seizure only applied
148

Id.
Id.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 609–10 (indicating that this risk is minimal because of the evidence
149

demonstrating probable cause to arrest Megan for driving while intoxicated and the fact that
she had three previous DWIs in ten years).
152
Id. at 609.
153
Id. at 610.
154

Id.
Id.
156
Id. at 611–12.
157
Id. at 612.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
155
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to innocent owners. 162 Lastly, and most critically, the risk of erroneous
deprivation was significant. 163 Helen purported to be an innocent owner, and
the forfeiture statute did not provide potential innocent owners a probablecause hearing nor the ability to expedite the process. 164 Therefore, the
eighteen-month delay for a post-seizure hearing was a violation of due
process, rendering the statute unconstitutional as applied to Helen. 165
IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Minnesota Supreme Court Should Have Applied Barker in Olson
The Minnesota Supreme Court overlooked the value of the Barker
factors when deciding the Olson case. This section begins by introducing
the United States Supreme Court’s incorporation of Barker into the context
of civil forfeiture. 166 Next, the quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture is
explored to show that it has a closer relationship to the criminal context in
Barker than the administrative context in Mathews. 167 A subsequent deeper
dive into the United States Supreme Court case reflects a mirror image of
Olson. 168 Finally, this section explains how applying Barker can avoid the
inference of judicial interference that can arise from applying Mathews. 169

1. The Integration of Barker in Civil Forfeiture
The Barker factors were initially established in a Sixth Amendment
due process case to address the timeliness of a delay leading up to a criminal
defendant’s trial. 170 Willie Barker was to be tried for murder following trial
of Silas Manning, the other suspected killer of an elderly couple. 171 It was
unlikely that Barker would be convicted without the testimony of Manning

162

Id.
Id. at 613.
164
Id. at 613–14.
165
Id. at 616.
166
See infra Section IV.A.1.
167
See infra Section II.A.2.
168
See infra Section II.A.3.
169
See infra Section II.A.4.
163

170
171

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515–16 (1972).

Id. at 516.
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against him. 172 Barker’s trial was delayed by sixteen continuances, resulting
in over five years between his arrest and trial. 173
Eventually, Barker was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. 174 He
filed a habeas corpus petition that ultimately landed in the United States
Supreme Court. 175 There, the Court developed a test to assess the timeliness
of process required in the criminal trial. 176 The test analyzed (1) the length
of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his
right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 177 Although the Court found that
“the length of delay between arrest and trial—well over five years—was
extraordinary,” it concluded that the remaining factors outweighed this time
frame. 178 Barker had not objected to the continuances until Manning was
convicted, nor did he want a speedy trial because he assumed he would not
be tried if Manning was acquitted. 179 Additionally, the Court found minimal
prejudice. 180 Therefore, the delay did not constitute a violation of his rights. 181
The Barker factors have since been extended to procedural due
process claims in the forfeiture context. 182 In United States v. Eight
Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 183 the
United States Supreme Court applied the Barker factors to assess
post-seizure delays in forfeiture. There, the Court analyzed whether the
delay between the seizure of $8,850 and the Government’s filing of a civil
forfeiture proceeding resulted in a due process violation. 184 The decision to
extend the Barker factors to a Fifth Amendment due process case involving
property forfeiture derived from careful consideration of the similarities

172

Id. (“The Commonwealth had a stronger case against Manning, and it believed that Barker
could not be convicted unless Manning testified against him. Manning was naturally unwilling
to incriminate himself. . . . By first convicting Manning, the Commonwealth would remove
possible problems of self-incrimination and would be able to assure his testimony against
Barker.”).
173
Id. at 516–18.
174
Id. at 518.
175

Id.
Id. at 530.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 533–34.
179
Id. at 534–35.
180
Id. at 534.
181
Id. at 536.
182
See, e.g., United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); United States v. Eight
176

Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556
(1983); People v. One 1998 GMC, 960 N.E.2d 1071, 1087–88 (Ill. 2011).
183
461 U.S. 555, 565–69 (1983).
184
Id. at 556.
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between the cases. 185 Additionally, the Court acknowledged that its previous
cases had only involved the issue of whether a pre-seizure hearing was
required. 186
Prior to $8,850, the Court had not faced the narrow inquiry concerning
the length of time of a post-seizure delay and due process violations. 187
Justice O’Connor explained that “[u]nlike the situation where due process
requires a prior hearing, there is no obvious bright line dictating when a
post-seizure hearing must occur.” 188 Interestingly, the Court never
mentioned the possibility of applying Mathews. By utilizing Barker, which
was ultimately designed to assess timeliness in the forfeiture context, $8,850
set new precedent. 189
Furthermore, the Court identified a significant discrepancy in the time
permitted for Government investigations before a post-deprivation hearing
in civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings. 190 The majority concluded that
“[a] suspect who has not been indicted retains his liberty; a claimant whose
property has been seized, however, has been entirely deprived of the use of
the property.” 191 The Court recognized that the situation of a criminal
defendant’s right to a speedy trial after an indictment, where he has been
completely deprived of liberty, was analogous to forfeiture. 192 Thus, in
$8,850, Barker was the appropriate tool for analyzing the timeliness of postseizure forfeiture proceedings. 193

185

Id. at 564 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment claim here—which challenges only the length of time
between the seizure and the initiation of the forfeiture trial—mirrors the concern of undue
delay encompassed in the right to a speedy trial.”).
186
Id. at 562–63; see also, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
187
$8,850, 461 U.S. at 562–63 (“Because our prior cases in this area have wrestled with
whether due process requires a pre-seizure hearing, we have not previously determined when
a post-seizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has
been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time.”).
188
Id. at 562.
189
Compare $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564 (holding that Barker factors should be applied in the
forfeiture context when assessing the length of time before a post-seizure hearing), with
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (invoking Mathews
in a forfeiture case to determine whether a hearing was required under due process prior to
the government seizing real property, which is distinguished from both issues regarding
timeliness and post-seizure hearings).
190
$8,850, 461 U.S. at 564.
191

Id.
Id.
193
Id.
192
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2. Civil Forfeiture—Cross-Over into the Criminal Context
Olson, a civil forfeiture case, should have adopted the Barker factors,
instead of adhering to Mathews, because its circumstances are more aligned
with the criminal context than with the administrative-benefits forfeiture in
Mathews. It is likely that if the Minnesota Supreme Court had relied on the
Barker factors, it would have found that section 169A.63 of the Minnesota
Statutes did not violate Megan and Helen Olson’s due process rights.
Instead, the court relied on Mathews. 194
While the Mathews framework has been used in a variety of
procedural due process challenges, 195 the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized that it is not a universal test for all procedural due
process claims. 196 Mathews was originally developed to determine the
adequacy of administrative procedures. 197 It simply provided courts with a
tool for analyzing fairness. 198 The Court, however, has quickly adopted it as
a decision-making test for cases in and out of the administrative context. 199
This widespread application has not gone uncontested. In fact, the use
of Mathews has been criticized for its overreach—even into the realm of
terrorism cases. 200 A major source of controversy appears in the criminal law
194

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 604 (Minn. 2019).
195
See generally Tom Pryor, Note, Turner v. Rogers, The Right to Counsel, and the
Deficiencies of Mathews v. Eldridge, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1854, 1861 (2013) (noting the vast
range of “procedural due process rules, precedents, and frameworks” that have evolved in
the United States Supreme Court over the last several decades and the impact of expanding
due process protections).
196
See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (“[W]e have never viewed
Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for deciding due process claims.”); United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 66 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)) (“The Court has expressly rejected the
notion that the Mathews balancing test constitutes a ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for deciding
every due process claim that comes before the Court.”).
197
Pryor, supra note 195, at 1862.
198
Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering
the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21
(2005), (arguing that the Mathews framework was established for the particular set of facts in
the case that could generate and facilitate a discussion of fairness rather than serve as a
determinative test).
199
Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716–17 (2003)).
200
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the court’s invocation of “this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ from Mathews v. Eldridge . . . a
case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits” was inappropriate). “Whatever the
merits of [the Mathews] technique when newly recognized property rights are at issue (and
even there they are questionable), it has no place where the Constitution and the common
law already supply an answer.” Id.
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context. Mathews hit a roadblock in Medina v. California, 201 where the Court
rejected the framework in addressing due process violations in criminal
procedure. 202 The Court reasoned:
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of
criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional
guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process
Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative
judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes
between liberty and order. 203
Accordingly, the Court deemed a narrower test to be more suitable for
decision-making in the criminal arena. 204
A closer look at the spectrum of procedural due process protections
raises a new question about the applicability of Mathews at the intersection
of criminal and civil procedure. In this spectrum, the greatest protections
are afforded in criminal proceedings 205 and the least to administrative
proceedings. 206 The safeguards given in civil proceedings fall between
criminal and administrative proceedings. 207 This is logical as the stakes are
much higher for a criminal defendant who may face the ultimate deprivation
of liberty through incarceration or capital punishment. 208 Civil forfeiture,
particularly, has been deemed quasi-criminal in nature. 209 While the goal of
201

505 U.S. 437 (1992).
Id. at 443 (“[T]he Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework
for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are part of the criminal process.”).
Additionally, the Court had applied Mathews in two criminal cases prior to announcing the
inadequacies of it in the criminal realm. However, it reasoned “it is not at all clear that
Mathews was essential to the results reached in those cases.” Id. at 444 (citing United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)).
203
Id. at 443.
204
Id.; see also 1 CRIM. PROC. § 2.7b (4th ed. 2018) (indicating that Medina deemed the
utilitarian balancing of Mathews to be “inconsistent with the ‘narrower inquiry’ traditionally
applied in determining what was ‘fundamentally unfair’ in a criminal case”).
205
Ramanujan Nadadur, Note, Beyond “Crimigration” and the Civil-Criminal Dichotomy—
Applying Mathews v. Eldridge in the Immigration Context, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.
J. 141, 146–47 (2013) (listing some of the constitutional rights afforded to criminal
defendants, including the right to jury trial and the right to counsel).
206
Id. at 159–60 (describing the minimum requirements in administrative proceedings as the
right to notice and the opportunity to be heard in writing).
207
Id. at 154–60 (enumerating the differences in procedural rights provided under each type
of proceeding).
208
See id. at 155.
United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Civil forfeiture
statutes, although not sufficiently criminal to trigger the full array of constitutional protections,
are nonetheless considered ‘quasi-criminal’ and implicate certain constitutional rights.”); see
also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993) (citing Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. 347
202

209
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civil forfeiture is remedial, the Court has acknowledged that there is also an
underlying punitive objective. 210
Forfeiture is unique because the proceedings inevitably subject a
property owner to being tied to criminal activity, regardless of the level of
the owner’s involvement. 211 A property owner in need of defending his or
her crime may face a catch-22 scenario—either surrender the right against
self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding or forfeit the use of evidence
in the civil proceeding. 212 Criminal law, where an individual’s liberty interest
may be infringed upon in order to protect societal interests, functions
comparably to forfeiture, where removing the instrument of crime through
the deprivation of a property interest serves societal interests. 213 Moreover,
a criminal defendant is not necessarily afforded the same level of pretrialhearing rights prior to a government action depriving him of liberty as a civil
litigant has prior to property deprivation. 214
Nonetheless, similar to the criminal context, where an individual’s
liberty interest is infringed upon by detention or incarceration, civil
forfeiture involves seizing a property interest. 215 As Justice Frankfurter stated,
“[The] right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of
any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” 216 Despite this
understanding that a hearing is required prior to the final deprivation of

(1808)); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921)) (“[T]his Court
. . . consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.”).
Austin, 509 U.S. at 617 (“If forfeiture had been understood not to punish the owner, there
would have been no reason to reserve the case of a truly innocent owner [in the more recent
cases]. Indeed, it is only on the assumption that forfeiture serves in part to punish that the
Court’s past reservation of that question makes sense.”); see also Leonard v. Texas, 137 S.
Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (“Modern civil forfeiture statutes are plainly designed, at least in part, to
punish the owner of property used for criminal purposes.”).
See Cheh, supra note 65, at 38 (emphasizing the criminal implications of civil forfeiture
proceedings and the negative consequences a property owner may face).
210

211

212
213

Id.
See id. at 6.

Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14
(2006) (“[D]ue process hearing rights that are routine in the pretrial stages of civil cases can
be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the comparable or greater
interests at stake.”).
215
See Stone, supra note 70, at 434–37 (discussing the controversy surrounding the due
process protections under civil forfeiture and its classification as civil rather than criminal,
despite the fact that property has already been deprived at that point).
216
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 169 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
214
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property, 217 certain circumstances in civil forfeiture permit deprivation
without a hearing. 218 Civil forfeiture, in instances where the deprivation has
occurred without a hearing, is more aligned with the criminal context
because the due process protections are afforded post-deprivation.
The realities of the criminal nature of forfeiture demonstrate that civil
forfeiture cases should be given similar safeguards afforded to criminal
cases. To facilitate these protections, courts assessing civil forfeiture should
look to Medina to avoid the broad, sweeping framework of Mathews and,
instead, employ narrower tests to provide the greatest protections in civil
forfeiture contexts. Given that the Olson court dealt with a due process issue
in the quasi-criminal context of forfeiture, it should have implemented the
narrower inquiry from Barker rather than the overly expansive Mathews
test.

3. The Use of Barker in $8,850 Mirrors Its Applicability in Olson
The Olson majority dismissed Barker as the overall mechanism for
resolving the issue at hand. 219 What is more, the court gave minimal, if any,
consideration to the glaring factual similarities between Olson and $8,850,
where the United States Supreme Court, as noted above, chose to apply
Barker in the context of forfeiture. 220
In $8,850, Mary Vasquez declared that she did not have more than
$5,000 in currency 221 while being processed through customs at the airport. 222
Customs officials seized $8,850 from her and sent a letter indicating that it
was subject to forfeiture. 223 In her answer to the complaint seeking forfeiture,

217

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557–58 (citing McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (quoting Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)) (“We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule
requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing, but only ‘in extraordinary circumstances where
some valid government interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the
event.’”).
219
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 603 n.5 (Minn. 2019). Nevertheless, the court applied “insights from Barker
and $8,850 where appropriate.” Id.
220
See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983).
221
Id. at 557. At the time, Section 231 of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 1101,
required individuals knowingly transporting currency in excess of $5,000 to declare the
amount with the United States Customs Service.
222
Id. at 558.
218

223

Id.
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Vasquez asserted an affirmative defense that the eighteen-month delay in
commencing her civil forfeiture action violated due process. 224
The issue in $8,850 was whether the eighteen-month delay of a postseizure forfeiture hearing constituted a due process violation. 225 In applying
Barker, the Court first acknowledged that eighteen months was a significant
delay. 226 Second, the Court determined that the reasons for the delay were
justifiable due to the Government’s “diligent pursuit” of processing
Vasquez’s petition for remission and pending criminal proceedings. 227
Third, Vasquez’s failure to seek the available remedies to assert her right to
a judicial hearing was assessed. 228 Finally, review of prejudice revealed that
Vasquez failed to demonstrate that the delay negatively impacted her
defense against the forfeiture. 229 Thus, the Court held that the
eighteen-month delay leading up to a post-seizure forfeiture hearing did not
violate due process rights. 230
The issue in Olson was identical—whether an eighteen-month delay in
post-seizure forfeiture proceedings offended due process. 231 Another
similarity with $8,850 was the underlying reason for the delay—the
restriction of proceeding to the post-seizure hearing until pending criminal
matters had concluded. 232 This limitation in both cases is important because
of the significant weight it carried in the quasi-criminal forfeiture context and
the challenges that emerged from the intertwining of civil forfeiture and
criminal proceedings.
First, initiating a civil proceeding contemporaneously may
compromise the criminal proceeding because forfeiture is frequently part
of the sentence. 233 Without the delay, the right against self-incrimination
through the civil proceedings may be implicated. 234 Additionally, prior civil
proceedings may inadvertently grant claimants access to details of the
pending criminal matters that claimants would not otherwise be privy to
under the stricter rules of criminal procedure. 235 Finally, a criminal
224

Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 556.
226
Id. at 565.
227
Id. at 568.
228
Id. at 568–69.
229
Id. at 569.
230
Id. at 570.
225

231

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 602 (Minn. 2019).
232
Compare $8,850, 461 U.S. at 567, with Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 599.
233
$8,850, 461 U.S. at 567.
234
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 611.
235
$8,850, 461 U.S. at 567.
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defendant may be able to assert that his or her defense in the criminal case
was prejudiced by contemporaneous civil proceedings. 236
It is crucial that criminal defendants are not prejudiced by
commencing a civil forfeiture proceeding. 237 Even if a statute allows for a
defendant to request an expedited civil proceeding, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring that the criminal proceedings take
precedence. These concerns are specifically addressed by the second
Barker factor—the reason for the delay.
Moreover, the claimants in $8,850 and Olson failed to pursue the
available remedies. In $8,850, Vasquez did not request the numerous
remedies available to initiate an expedited forfeiture hearing, such as
seeking the return of her seized property by filing an equitable action, filing
a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), or requesting
the matter to be referred to the United States Attorney. 238 Similarly, in
Olson, Helen did not pursue any action through the remission or mitigation
provisions provided in the statute, post bond, or inquire about expediting
the hearing. 239
With each of these similarities, it is surprising that the Olson court
did not choose Barker. Through $8,850, the United States Supreme Court
made a deliberate decision to extend Barker to civil forfeiture cases.
Mathews had already made a prominent mark in due process analysis, yet
it was never referenced in $8,850. Given that Barker was applied in $8,850,
the majority in Olson should have followed suit to evaluate this specific issue
involving how quickly a hearing must be provided post-seizure. 240 While the
court in Olson explained that the Barker factors and Mathews framework
overlap, 241 it conceded that some aspects of prejudice to the individual facing
236

United States v. One 1976 Mercedes, 667 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1982) (noting that a pending
criminal case would take precedence over commencing forfeiture proceedings due to the
risk of a defendant’s assertion of prejudice in defending the criminal case).
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN:
JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-1083) (“Criminal
defendants have constitutional rights that civil litigants do not. If a civil proceeding is not
stayed, criminal defendants may lose those protections in the criminal prosecution. . . . So
to protect criminal defendants from having to choose between defending their liberty in
criminal court and protecting their property in civil court, the DWI forfeiture statute stays
the civil proceeding and requires the criminal case to go first.”).
238
$8,850, 461 U.S. at 569.
239
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600.
240
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General at 3, Olson v. One 1999 Lexus
MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn.
2019) (No. A17-1083) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General].
241
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 603 n.5.
237
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a delay are not sufficiently addressed by Mathews. 242 Considering the factors
above, the majority could have reached a different conclusion in Olson,
given that Mathews does not fully encompass all of the considerations in
Barker. 243 Therefore, the court should have employed the Barker factors to
properly evaluate this specific procedural due process question of
timeliness.

4. Barker Provides an Opportunity to Avoid Criticism of Mathews
Barker asserts factors that are more objective in nature, which helps
to avoid the appearance of judicial interference. By choosing Mathews, the
Minnesota Supreme Court disregarded the framework’s primary criticism. 244
Similar to the vague language of the Due Process Clause, the Mathews
framework leaves the balance of competing private and governmental
interests open to interpretation. 245 Consequently, judges are compelled to
weigh factors that are impossible to truly measure. 246
In Olson, the majority compared the private interests of both Helen
and Megan to conclude that one was stronger than the other, but the
majority was unable to articulate the extent of the difference or how this
would actually be quantified when balancing the other Mathews factors. 247
242

Id. (“[T]he ability of a person deprived of property to hold the government to account
without the loss of evidence or faded memories that can sometimes accompany a long delay
is an important private interest that is not fully captured in the traditional Mathews inquiry
into ‘private interests.’”).
243
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 982 (1987) (commenting on
the arbitrary nature of balancing tests of individual versus government interests that have
injected subjectivity and manipulation into constitutional interpretation); Lawson et al., supra
note 198, at 21 (arguing that the Mathews framework was established for the particular set of
facts at hand that could generate and facilitate a discussion of fairness, but it was not intended
to serve as a determinative test).
See Aleinikoff, supra note 244.
246
Pryor, supra note 195, at 1885; see also Rubin, supra note 36, at 1138 (articulating the
complications in attempting to balance private and government interests that have virtually
unavoidable contradictions between them) (“This reliance upon ‘weight,’ which is a useful
approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where factors such as
those in Mathews are concerned.”); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?—A
Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 748–49 (1963) (“As soon as he
finishes measuring the unmeasurable, the judge’s next job is to compare the incomparable.
Even if he has succeeded in stating the interests quantitatively (or thinks he has), they are still
interests of different kinds and therefore they can no more be compared quantitatively than
sheep can be subtracted from goats.”).
247
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 612 (“[A]lthough Helen’s private interest is not as strong as it would
be if her license had been valid at the time of the seizure, her interest in the vehicle as both
244

245
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The framework’s lack of guidance and excessive flexibility enables decisionmakers to mold the factors to fit the desired outcome. 248 For instance, the
court in Olson could have come to the opposite conclusion and affirmed
the court of appeals’ decision that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional
as applied to Megan, by emphasizing her private interest in the vehicle. After
all, she was the exclusive driver of the vehicle and was solely responsible for
its repairs. 249
This loose rein on judicial interpretation through Mathews may
inadvertently lead judges to adjudicate based upon individual policy
preferences. 250 This may be especially problematic in the civil forfeiture
realm, where there is a rising concern of injustice. For instance, Justice
Thomas authored a statement in 2017 involving a petition for writ of
certiorari of a civil forfeiture action, which seemed to serve in part as a call
for reform due to the growing number of forfeitures and their increasing
abuse. 251 There, he questioned whether historical practice could continue to
justify the constitutionality of civil forfeiture. 252
Minnesota, in particular, has focused on the issue of civil forfeiture
abuse. In fact, new legislation has been introduced to place a complete ban
on all administrative forfeitures. 253 In 2017, Minnesota had 3596 DWIrelated forfeitures, 254 accounting for forty-six percent of reported
forfeitures. 255 This number reflects an increase of over 450 forfeitures from
2016. 256 Moreover, in 2017, the net proceeds from forfeited property and
a financial asset and as property having social-use value makes her private interest stronger
than Megan’s interest.”).
248
Nadadur, supra note 205, at 152–53 (identifying the common criticisms of Mathews,
including the rejection of the framework in criminal procedure and its vulnerability to
“outcome-oriented analysis”).
249
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 609 n.10.
250
See Pryor, supra note 195, at 1876 (discussing the dangers of judges advocating for policy
preferences through balancing the Mathews factors, “where they are neither constitutionally
entitled nor institutionally capable”).
251
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (“[B]ecause the law enforcement entity
responsible for seizing the property often keeps it, these entities have strong incentives to
pursue forfeiture. . . . This system—where police can seize property with limited judicial
oversight and retain it for their own use—has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses.”).
252

Id.

H.R. 1971, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess. (Minn. 2019).
254
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 609 (citing REBECCA OTTO, CRIMINAL FORFEITURES IN
MINNESOTA FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2017, at 12–14 (2018),
https://www.auditor.state.mn.us/reports/gid/2017/forfeiture/forfeiture_17_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CT3W-9DQF]).
OTTO, supra note 254, at 12.
256
Id. at 13.
253

255
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seized cash totaled over $7 million, 257 with seventy percent kept by the
seizing law enforcement agency, twenty percent by the prosecuting agency,
and ten percent by Minnesota’s General Fund. 258
The Olson majority noted that when a pecuniary interest is directly
linked to the outcome of a decision, there is a call for closer judicial
scrutiny. 259 Given that civil forfeiture has been vehemently debated, the use
of Mathews may have led the court to bend, even unintentionally, towards
individual policy preferences supporting civil forfeiture reform. 260 By
incorporating the less subjective Barker factors into its analysis, the court
could have been better equipped to defend against those perceptions. The
court, however, will likely continue to follow its new precedent of applying
Mathews to civil forfeiture cases involving timing, which will open the door
for perceptions of judicial activism.

B. Despite Barker, the Minnesota Supreme Court Chose Mathews
The Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously applied Mathews in
Olson. This section demonstrates the court’s error by highlighting the
differences between the issues in Goldberg and Mathews with the issues in
Barker and Olson. Additionally, this section argues that the court’s
261

reliance on broad precedent in procedural due process matters caused the
court to lose sight of the differences between private property and
administrative benefits. 262

1. The Mathews Test Is Inapposite Because the Issues in Goldberg
and Mathews Are Not Aligned with the Issues in Barker and
Olson

Despite the fundamental differences between the issues in Mathews
and Olson, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied Mathews instead of
Barker to determine whether subdivision 9(d) of the forfeiture statute was

257

Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
259
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 610 n.12 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop.,
258

510 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1993)).
260
22 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, FORFEITURES § 1.01 (2019) (“Forfeitures are regarded with
increasing disfavor.”). The call for reform was highlighted in a brief, arguing that “[t]he Court
should take the opportunity to rein in civil forfeiture.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for
Justice at 18–20, Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate No. 851LDV VIN:
JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2019) (No. A17-1083).
261
See infra Section IV.B.1.
262
See infra Section IV.B.2.
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constitutional as applied to Megan and Helen Olson. 263 Mathews, emanating
from Goldberg v. Kelly, 264 focused on a general due process inquiry. 265 The
intent in developing the Mathews framework was to ensure the government
followed a fair process in administrative proceedings 266 and to prevent the
risk of wrongful deprivation of benefits. 267 The particular issues were
whether an evidentiary hearing was required pre-termination and what
process was due. 268 These issues are distinguished from the question posed
in Olson in two significant ways.
First, the Olson court grappled with the narrow issue of timing, as
related to a hearing in the forfeiture context. 269 In contrast, the preliminary
question in Mathews was whether due process required a hearing to take
place at all. 270 Unlike Mathews, the statute in question in Olson provided for
a hearing, albeit prior to the forfeiture adjudication. 271 Neither of the Olsons
even argued for a pre-seizure hearing. 272 Thus, the Court acknowledged that
the central issue in Olson was specific to the timing between the seizure of
the vehicle and the first hearing, and whether this delay constituted a due
process violation. 273 The Barker factors take the aspects of timing directly
into consideration by specifically targeting the length and reason for the
delay. 274 Therefore, cases like Olson that concern the timing of postdeprivation civil forfeiture hearings fall outside of the scope of Mathews.
Second, Goldberg and Mathews involved pre-termination hearings. 275
This addressed concerns of fair process prior to the deprivation of property.
The issue in Olson concerned post-seizure proceedings, 276 which implicate
due process after depriving the individual of property. Olson is analogous
263
264
265

Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 603.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
266
See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1137 (referencing the underlying principle in forming the
Mathews framework).
267
See id. at 1160–62 (comparing the due process protections afforded to government
benefits but noting that “[t]he distinction between those benefits that are legitimately
discretionary and those that must be constrained by procedural protections and predefined
rules has not been established by the case law”); see also infra Section IV.B.2.
268
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323.
269
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 602 (Minn. 2019).
270
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323.
271
MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 9 (2018).
272
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602.
273

Id.
Id. at 603.
275
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).
276
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600.
274
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to the proceedings in Barker that occurred after the loss of liberty. 277 This
critical difference signifies the limits of Mathews’ reach. After seizure, the
timing of a hearing becomes paramount. 278 The urgency of prompt predeprivation hearings is arguably less than that for post-deprivation hearings
because before deprivation, the individual maintains control of the interest
at stake up until adjudication. 279
It may be argued that Mathews’ individual-interest prong is adequate
to assess the level of need for promptness. After all, that was a defining
distinction between the results of Goldberg and Mathews. The decision in
Goldberg was significantly controlled by the substantial burden placed on
an individual from losing his or her welfare benefits. 280 The Court stated:
By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or
assets. . . . Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the
face of . . . ‘brutal need’ without a prior hearing of some sort is
unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it. . .
. The crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive
an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits. 281
In contrast, the Court, in Mathews, held that disability benefits did not
necessitate this same requirement because eligibility there did not hinge on
financial need. 282 Additionally, the fundamental reason for terminating
disability benefits was that “the worker [was] no longer disabled or ha[d]
returned to work,” 283 which reduced the hardship of the loss. Thus,
Mathews’ individual-interest factor considered the nature of the burden to
determine the urgency of a prompt hearing.
The Olson court noted that Mathews adequately addressed the
question of urgency of a prompt post-seizure hearing. 284 Nevertheless,
Barker is a more appropriate test because it involved an even greater need
277

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 564 (1972).
See Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 611 (quoting Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979))
(“Furthermore, the Court has held that after property has been seized without a hearing, ‘the

278

[property owner’s] interest in a speedy resolution of the controversy becomes paramount.’”);
see also Kuckes, supra note 214, at 12 (“In the limited circumstances when the government
may take action before a hearing, the process required must be provided as soon as possible
thereafter.”).
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602.
280
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
281
Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
282
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).
283
Id. at 336.
284
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602–03.
279
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for urgency—the deprivation of liberty by incarceration. 285 Barker involved a
habeas corpus petition, where the stakes of delaying adjudication are
highest. 286 Depriving liberty arguably has a much stronger need for an urgent
and prompt hearing than the deprivation of a government entitlement.
The hardship faced in civil forfeiture resembles the burden posed in
Barker. In $8,850, the Court weighed the burden of forfeiting a substantial
amount of money for eighteen months. 287 Similarly, the Olsons faced
adversity in losing a vehicle for eighteen months. 288 The seizure stripped
them of a mode of transportation, as well as their economic interest in
selling or using the vehicle as collateral for a loan. 289 Thus, since the Olson
court determined that the urgency of a prompt hearing was a critical
question, the Barker factors would have been better suited to address the
delay.

2. The Court’s Decision to Use the Broad-sweeping Mathews Test
Resulted in Disregarding the Differences Between Private
Property and Administrative Benefits
The Olson majority rationalized its decision to invoke the Mathews
framework by following precedent. 290 The Minnesota Supreme Court had
set the practice of employing the Mathews test in procedural due process
claims. 291 However, each of the cases cited by the majority covered a wide
range of due process challenges, none of which pertained to civil
forfeiture. 292
285
286
287

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972).
Id. at 518.

United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983).
288
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600.
289
Id. at 612.
290
Id. at 604.
291
292

Id.
See, e.g., Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 619 (Minn. 2016) (personal injury action);

Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785–86 (Minn. 2014) (order for protection); Sawh v.
City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012) (designating a dog to be potentially
dangerous was not a property interest); State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2007)
(driver license revocation); Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 415–16
(Minn. 2007) (driver’s license revocation); Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 600 N.W.2d
720, 723–24 (Minn. 1999) (driver’s license revocation); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545
N.W.2d 901, 908–09 (Minn. 1996) (teaching license revocation); Martin v. Itasca City, 448
N.W.2d 368, 370 (Minn. 1989) (leave of absence policy); Violette v. Midwest Printing Co.–
Webb Publ’g, 415 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1987) (workers’ compensation benefits); In re
Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1986) (civil commitment statute); Machacek v. Voss,
361 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. 1985) (child support payments); Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336
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In particular, the Minnesota Supreme Court strongly emphasized its
holding in Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Public Safety 293 to justify its
application of Mathews. 294 The issue in Fedziuk was whether due process,
in the context of a license revocation under an implied consent law, was
violated. 295 There, the statute in question failed to specify any time period
for judicial review, which caused a violation of due process. 296 The Olson
dissent noted that the nature of the due process challenge in Fedziuk was
different because it did not involve property forfeiture. 297 While Mathews—
decided in the administrative context—is more relevant in license
revocation, 298 it is less applicable in the setting of civil forfeiture. 299
The Olson court’s unrelenting reliance on Mathews ignored the
distinction between the deprivation of private property interests and the
deprivation of administrative benefits. These differences can be illustrated
by returning to the concept of protections on a spectrum. 300 Forfeiture of
private property raises the stakes with its quasi-criminal nature. 301 Forfeiture
demands notice and a hearing—both due process requirements. 302 Other
constitutional requirements, such as the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines, also
apply in the context of civil forfeiture. 303 Thus, private property interests
receive greater protections from deprivation.
N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn. 1983) (driver’s license revocation); State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1978) (parole release).
293
Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d 340, 348 (Minn. 2005) (holding that the absence of language to
require a prompt hearing for review of driver’s license revocations within the Minnesota
Implied Consent Law provisions violated procedural due process).
294
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 604.
295
Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d at 342.
296
297
298

Id.
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 616 n.1 (Gildea, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 604 (noting that the Mathews test has been appropriately applied in the context

of implied consent license revocation).
See id. at 616 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the
Barker test is more appropriate in the context of civil forfeiture than the Mathews test).
300
See discussion supra Section IV.A.2.
301
See supra text accompanying notes 205–18.
302
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 607.
HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIM. LAW & PROC. § 36:68
(4th ed. 2018); see also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965)
(holding that the exclusionary rule applied in forfeiture, and unlawfully-seized evidence from
a vehicle could not be used in a civil forfeiture proceeding). The United States Supreme
Court has subsequently limited the reach of the exclusionary rule by incorporating a
balancing test weighing deterrent effects with societal costs, but it remains an applicable rule
in civil forfeiture proceedings. See Joshua Lewellyn, Note, Losing Your Navigator: Why the
Exclusionary Rule Should Not Apply to Civil Asset Forfeiture Proceedings, 13 LIBERTY U.
299
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Lower on the spectrum lies public benefits. These benefits are
statutorily created and can be broken down into the categories of
discretionary or non-discretionary. 304 Non-discretionary benefits—such as
welfare benefits—must be afforded the minimum, constitutionally-required
procedures, including notice and the opportunity to be heard. 305
Discretionary benefits, however, belong at the very end of the continuum
with the least amount of protection. They can be eliminated even without
the minimum procedures. 306
On this scale, the government action in Fedziuk—revoking a license 307
lies closer to Mathews’ termination of disability benefits than the deprivation
of private property through civil forfeiture in Olson. Therefore, in the
absence of a forfeiture case, the justification in using Mathews, only to rely
on precedent, is flawed.

C. Predictions of the Results in Olson under the Barker Factors
The outcome in Olson likely would have been different in some
respects, and the same in others, if the Barker factors had been
implemented. The Barker framework, like the Mathews framework, would
likely have resulted in the finding of constitutionality of section 169A.63 of
the Minnesota Statutes as applied to Megan Olson. 308 The outcome for
Helen Olson, however, could have been different under Barker because
the statute would likely be constitutional as applied to her. 309 Additionally,
this section postulates the scenario for a typical innocent owner under
Barker and demonstrates that the Barker factors may be more favorable for
these individuals. 310
L. REV. 153, 153–54 (2018); see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)
(quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989))
(“[Forfeiture] constitutes ‘payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,’ and, as
such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.”)
See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1160–62 (comparing the due process protections afforded to
government benefits but noting that “[t]he distinction between those benefits that are
legitimately discretionary and those that must be constrained by procedural protections and
predefined rules has not been established by the case law”).
305
See id. (reciting “social welfare benefits or public education” as examples of
nondiscretionary benefits that are provided based on eligibility).
306
See id. (“When the benefit is awarded to a small number of ‘best’ candidates, it is
legitimately discretionary. A research grant, a government construction contract, or the
placement of a child for adoption would be obvious examples.”).
307
Fedziuk, 696 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. 2005).
308
See infra Section IV.C.1.
309
See infra Section IV.C.2.
310
See infra Section IV.C.3.
304
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1. The Finding of Constitutionality as Applied to Megan Olson
Had Barker been used, the Minnesota Supreme Court would likely
have reached the same conclusion with respect to Megan Olson—that the
statute was constitutional as applied to her. Under the first Barker factor—
the length of the delay—eighteen months would still likely be considered
substantial. 311
Second, the underlying reason delaying the forfeiture proceeding—the
second Barker factor—was to protect Megan Olson as a criminal
defendant. 312 Given that the vehicle in question was used to facilitate the
commission of her alleged crime, instituting a forfeiture proceeding before
the criminal trial could undermine her criminal case. Thus, the second
Barker factor would support a finding of as-applied constitutionality for
Megan.
Third, Megan demonstrated a lack of effort in asserting her rights,
which frustrates the third Barker factor. 313 The hearing was continued six
times due to her pending criminal matter. 314 Even so, Megan never
demanded a speedy hearing. 315 In fact, she agreed to several continuances. 316
This is analogous to Barker, where the lack of objections to a series of
continuances showed that the defendant did not desire a speedy trial. 317
Moreover, she did not pursue recovery of the vehicle through the statute’s
remission or mitigation provisions, nor did she post bond for the vehicle. 318
Finally, the minimal prejudice posed to Megan from the delay would
probably be insufficient to render section 169A.63 of the Minnesota
Statutes unconstitutional under the fourth Barker factor—prejudice to
defendant. At the time of her arrest, Megan was driving without a valid
311

See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983) (finding an eighteen-month delay to be substantial).
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 611 (Minn. 2019) (“One reason the State proffers for this delay is the need to
protect the criminally charged individual from incriminating herself in a civil proceeding.”).
313
Id. at 600.
314
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 910 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
315
See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 237, at 7.
316
Olson, 910 N.W.2d at 76 (“[T]he district court noted that there was no dispute of material
fact that the ‘matter was continued several times at the agreement of all involved as they
awaited the conclusion of the underlying criminal action.’”).
317
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534–36 (1972); see also Jovanovic, supra note 59, at 4
(“[Regarding the third Barker factor], the claimant’s assertion of the right to a judicial hearing,
the court held that if the clamant fails to file an equitable action seeking an order compelling
the filing of the forfeiture action or return of the seized property, or fails to take other action
which could trigger the rapid filing of a forfeiture action, this can be taken as some indication
that the claimant did not desire an early judicial hearing.”).
318
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600.
312
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license. 319 It had been cancelled for her conduct that was “inimical to public
safety.” 320 Therefore, the prejudice would be limited because she lacked the
ability to legally drive. What is more, Megan was not the owner of the car,
which meant that her transportation and economic interests in the vehicle
were limited. 321 Thus, the delay caused minimal prejudice. Since the
majority of the Barker factors indicate that the delay in the post-seizure
hearing was not unreasonable, the court would probably still have reversed
the court of appeals’ holding that the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to Megan.

2. The Finding of Constitutionality as Applied to Helen Olson
Had the Minnesota Supreme Court utilized the Barker factors instead
of the Mathews framework, Helen Olson might have received a negative
outcome. Even though she purported to be an innocent owner, her
particular situation may have led the court to find that the delay was not
unreasonable. 322
In considering the first Barker factor—the length of the delay—the court
would likely continue to acknowledge that a delay of eighteen months was
substantial. 323 Although the length of the delay would undermine the
constitutionality of the statute, the remaining Barker factors would likely
outweigh the length of the delay and ultimately lead to a finding of
constitutionality.
The second Barker factor—the reason for the delay—is debatable. On
the one hand, Helen was limited by the statute’s requirement to conclude
pending criminal matters before proceeding with a forfeiture hearing. 324 On
the other hand, the delay was also caused by Helen’s lack of action in
asserting her rights, as discussed under the third factor below. As Chief
Justice Gildea’s dissent stated, “[T]he delay here is largely the result of
choices that Helen made.” 325 Thus, it is unclear whether the second Barker
factor would aid or thwart Helen’s interests.
The third and fourth Barker factors, concerning the assertion of rights
and prejudice to the claimant, would likely tip the scale in favor of the
statute’s constitutionality as applied to Helen. Helen did not assert her rights
319

Id. at 609.
Id.
321
Id.
322
See id. at 616–18 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
323
See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
320

Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983) (finding an eighteen-month delay to be substantial).
324
Id. at 600.
325
Id. at 617 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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by requesting an expedited hearing as an allegedly-innocent owner would,
under section 169A.63, subdivision 7(d), of the Minnesota Statutes. 326 In
fact, Chief Justice Gildea noted that Helen “essentially took no action in the
forfeiture proceeding” until a year after filing the demand, when she filed
the motion for summary judgment. 327 Even if she had pushed for her
innocent-owner defense, it likely would not have succeeded unless she
could clearly demonstrate that she had no knowledge of or tried to prevent
Megan’s unlawful activity. 328 This would likely be a difficult hurdle to
overcome due to Megan and Helen’s familial relationship. 329 Additionally,
Helen did not assert her right under section 169A.63, subdivision 5(a), to
petition for a return of the vehicle, nor did she post a bond. 330 Moreover,
she did not object to any of the six continuances that delayed a speedy
hearing. 331 Each of these failures to seek available remedies undermines
Helen’s argument for unconstitutionality under the third Barker factor—the
defendant’s assertion of her right.
Finally, the fourth Barker factor—prejudice to defendant—would likely
frustrate Helen’s case. Her license had already been suspended at the time
of the seizure, and she would not be able to legally drive the vehicle,
regardless of the delay. 332 The court may have found a delay to be more
reasonable for a claimant who is unable to use the vehicle in the first place.
While Helen would still have an economic interest in the vehicle, it would
probably not be substantial enough to consider the delay prejudicial. 333 The
court also noted that Megan was the exclusive driver of the vehicle, 334 which
would further mitigate prejudice from the delay to Helen. Given this analysis
under Barker, Helen’s particular circumstances would probably fail to
demonstrate a due process violation.
326

Id.
Id.
328
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 7(d) (2018) (requiring, “by clear and convincing
327

evidence,” that the Petitioner “did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle
would be used or operated in” an unlawful manner, or that Petitioner “took reasonable steps
to prevent the use of the vehicle by the offender”).
329
See id. (“If the offender is a family or household member of any of the owners who
petition the court and has three or more prior impaired driving convictions, the petitioning
owner is presumed to know of any vehicle use by the offender that is contrary to law.”).
330
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 600.
331
See Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 910 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018).
332
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 612.
333
Id. at 618 (Gildea, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he delay in getting
back a car that she cannot drive is not sufficient prejudice to support the conclusion that the
statute is unconstitutional.”).
334
Id. at 609.
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3. The Outcome for a Typical Innocent Owner
Although Helen Olson’s innocent-owner defense may not have
prevailed under Barker, these factors may provide a stronger claim for
innocent owners in general, as elucidated by the Minnesota Attorney
General’s amicus brief. First, the length of the delay would vary for other
innocent owners because section 169A.63, subdivision 9(d), of the
Minnesota Statutes does not set a time frame for a hearing after the pending,
related criminal matters have been resolved. 335 Because section 169A.63
does not afford innocent owners a probable-cause hearing or a preliminary
hearing for their innocent-owner affirmative defense, this first factor should
carry more weight for an innocent owner when a pending criminal matter
causes a lengthier delay in asserting the innocent-owner defense. 336
Second, the reason for the delay may also aid an innocent owner
because the underlying reasons for a delay due to pending criminal matters
do not protect the innocent owner in the same way that they protect a
criminal defendant. 337 As the innocent owner is not a party to the criminal
matter, she or he has no involvement in or control over the speed of the
proceedings. 338 Thus, citing pending criminal matters as justification for the
delay may not be reasonable for an innocent owner. 339 This will weigh in the
innocent owner’s favor.
Third, the outcome of the third Barker factor—the assertion of rights
by the innocent owner—will vary based on the facts of the case. Depending
on the action taken, this factor may help or hinder the balance of factors in
an innocent owner’s case. Section 169A.63, subdivisions 4 and 5(a), of the
Minnesota Statutes provide two pathways for an individual to assert her
rights. 340
One option is to post a bond. 341 In that case, the vehicle is returned
with a disabling device rendering it temporarily undrivable. 342 Since an
innocent owner cannot use the vehicle under these circumstances, the
decision not to seek this option would probably be insignificant. The second
option is to file a petition for remission or mitigation with the county
prosecutor. 343 In determining whether to grant remission or mitigation, the
335

Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General, supra note 240, at 7.
Id. at 8.
337
Id. at 10.
336

338

Id.
Id.
340
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id. at 11.
343
Id.
339
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prosecutor weighs the government’s need for possessing the vehicle against
the particular innocent owner’s individual circumstances. 344 As the
Minnesota Court of Appeals noted, a court will likely have difficulty in
assessing the sufficiency of the hardship relief that is offered if the owners
never pursue the available remedies. 345 Therefore, failure to assert this right
for available relief may weigh against the innocent owner in the balance of
these factors and weaken the possibility of establishing undue delay. 346
Finally, the fourth Barker factor—prejudice caused by the delay—is
enhanced for an innocent owner. For innocent owners, the prehearing delay
is the “direct cause of a deprivation [of their mode of transportation] that
can limit [their] ability to earn a living and otherwise participate in modern
social life.” 347 In contrast, the delay for a DWI defendant who drives and
owns a vehicle would not be the cause of the inability to drive because the
offender’s license is likely to have been suspended regardless. 348
All in all, Barker would likely have been more effective than Mathews
in recognizing the urgency required for innocent-owner forfeiture hearings
without clearing the path for claims from guilty owners charged with
DWIs. 349 Given that the forfeiture statute does not permit the seizure of a
vehicle if the registered owner is innocent, 350 an innocent owner with a valid
license, who pursues the statute’s remedies, may overcome the obstacles
that Helen could not under Barker.

D. Implications for Future Decisions in Minnesota
The use of Mathews instead of Barker is likely to strengthen
procedural due process claims for guilty owners with repeat DWI offenses
and confine Barker to Sixth Amendment speedy trial cases. Olson, by
applying Mathews, established a common private interest of ownership,
shared by both innocent and guilty owners. Affording owners guilty of DWI
offenses the same rights as innocent owners might, in the future, result in a
344
345

Id.

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus, 910 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (“[W]e cannot
determine whether the Olsons could have obtained adequate hardship relief under Minn.
Stat. § 169A.63 because they failed to seek such relief.”).
346
Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Attorney General, supra note 240, at 12.
347
Id. at 13.
348
349

Id.
See id. at 7–13 (assessing each of the factors and arguing that the success of a constitutional

challenge regarding timeliness of post-seizure hearings for innocent owners may be greater
than individuals facing DWI charges when the Barker factors are applied). For further
discussion of Mathews’ impact on guilty owners charged with DWIs, see infra Section
IV.D.1.
350
See MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 7(d) (2019).
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pathway for guilty owners to succeed in similar procedural due process
claims. 351 Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has now cast aside the
United States Supreme Court’s use of Barker in the forfeiture context,
which steers Minnesota towards a universal Mathews test for future
procedural due process cases. 352

1. The Comparison of Innocent Owners to Guilty Owners Likely
Risks an Influx of Timing-Related Procedural Due Process
Cases
Due to the application of Mathews in Olson, Minnesota courts may
experience an influx of claims pursuing prompt post-seizure hearings. In
applying Mathews to determine that section 169A.63, subdivision 9(d), of
the Minnesota Statutes was unconstitutional as applied to Helen, the court
stressed the risk of erroneous deprivation to innocent owners. 353 The
innocent-owner defense allows for the property’s recovery if the owner can
“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioning owner
did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used
or operated in any manner contrary to law or that the petitioning owner took
reasonable steps to prevent use of the vehicle by the offender.” 354
However, by upholding the use of Mathews in Olson, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has essentially devised a new avenue for DWI offenders in
forfeiture cases to challenge the statute. While Helen purported to be an
innocent, non-driving owner, there may be similar instances in the future
where guilty drivers who own a seized vehicle assert this same due process
claim. 355 A crucial difference between Megan’s and Helen’s interests was that
Helen was the owner and Megan was not. 356 That said, the interests of private
owners—even guilty owners—are much more aligned with innocent

351
352

See infra Section IV.D.1.
See infra Section IV.D.2.

Olson v. One 1999 Lexus MN License Plate: 851LDV VIN: JT6HF10U6X0079461, 924
N.W.2d 594, 613 (Minn. 2019).
354
MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 7(d) (2019).
See Charles Ramsay, Minnesota’s DWI Forfeiture Law Found Unconstitutional, MINN.
DWI DEF. BLOG (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.ramsayresults.com/minnesotas-dwiforfeiture-law-found-unconstitutional?back_page=137
[https://perma.cc/3C7Y-TN5K]
(observing that an individual who owns a vehicle and is arrested while driving has private
interests that are much more aligned with innocent owners than non-owners, which may have
significant impact on weighing the factors).
356
See Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 608–16.
353

355
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owners. 357 All owners alike have an interest in transportation. 358 Additionally,
all owners have an economic interest in selling, loaning, or using a vehicle
as collateral. 359
Consequently, the court may encounter a rise in challenges concerning
the length of delay between vehicle seizure and post-seizure forfeiture
hearings from DWI offenders who also own the vehicle. Olson has set the
precedent of applying Mathews to forfeiture cases going forward. By
establishing Helen’s strong individual interest as a purported innocent
owner, 360 Olson has made it more difficult for the state to overcome the same
high-level private interest afforded to repeat DWI driver-owners. This may
frustrate the State’s efforts in keeping repeat DWI offenders off the road. 361
Applying Barker would have avoided this issue of supporting the
private interests of guilty owners. Unlike Mathews, Barker does not
expressly rely on balancing private interests. 362 Thus, applying Barker does
not bring to light the private interests that guilty owners can now argue are
impaired. Without directly incorporating the assessment of private interests
into the factors, Barker effectively prevents the shared interests of innocent
and guilty owners from being recognized as a key element in analyzing due
process violations.

2. Disregarding Barker in Olson Limits Barker’s Use Going Forward
Since Olson marked the first time the Minnesota Supreme Court
encountered the specific issue of delay in a forfeiture hearing, its decision
to employ Mathews over Barker sets the precedent for subsequent cases.
357
358

See Ramsay, supra note 355.
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 604 (quoting Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 256, 260–61 (8th Cir.

1994)) (“Automobiles occupy a central place in the lives of most Americans, providing access
to jobs, schools, and recreation as well as to the daily necessities of life.”).
359
Id. at 605 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54–55
(1993)).
360
Id. at 612.
361
Id. at 609 (quoting State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 570 (Minn. 2007)) (“[D]runken
drivers pose a severe threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota[,] . . . [and]
[t]he state has a compelling interest in highway safety that justifies its efforts to keep impaired
drivers off the road, particularly those drivers who have shown a repeated willingness to drive
while impaired.”). In Minnesota, the forfeiture of property associated with designated
offenses is intended to “enhanc[e] public safety by separating repeat intoxicated drivers from
the instrumentality used to commit criminal actions.” 22 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST,
FORFEITURES, § 1.02(e) (2019).
362
Compare Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (identifying the four Barker factors,
none of which explicitly pertain to private interests), with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976) (specifying private interests as the first component to be considered under the
Mathews framework).
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This represents one more type of procedural due process matter to be
tossed in the bottomless Mathews bucket. Given that in Olson, the broad
Mathews test was chosen to address a narrow due process question,
Minnesota may be migrating towards a single, all-encompassing test for due
process cases.
This practice has been repeatedly denounced by the United States
Supreme Court because of the direct contradiction between a universal test
and the flexible nature of the procedural due process doctrine. 363 Perhaps
Justice Frankfurter said it best when he stated, “Expressing as it does in its
ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment
which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional
history and civilization, ‘due process’ cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula.” 364
The Minnesota Supreme Court has now foreclosed the possibility of
using Barker to analyze delays in forfeiture proceedings. By forfeiting the
opportunity to use Barker in this instance, the court has likely constricted
future uses of Barker solely to Sixth Amendment speedy trial cases. The
Minnesota Supreme Court put an end to the use of Barker in forfeiture
before it could begin.
V. CONCLUSION
For the first time, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced the issue of the
constitutionality of a post-seizure delay arising from a forfeiture statute. To
make this determination, the court confronted the question of whether to
assess the claims using the Mathews framework or the Barker factors. 365 The
Mathews framework was designed to assess the constitutionality of process
in general, while the Barker factors were intended to evaluate the
constitutionality of time delays in particular. 366 Despite the majority’s
acknowledgement that the principal issue was the permissible length of a
procedural delay, 367 the court selected Mathews. 368 In part, this decision was
based on the court’s inclination to follow precedent in procedural due
process cases. 369 Nonetheless, the court failed to properly consider the
363

See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002); Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 443 (1992); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
364
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 at 162 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
365
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 601.
366
See Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 237, at 6.
367
Olson, 924 N.W.2d at 602.
368
Id. at 603.
369

Id.

2020]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

773

narrow precedent set by the United States Supreme Court’s use of the
Barker factors in assessing the timing of post-deprivation delays in the
forfeiture context. 370
Applying Mathews may result in the unintended consequence of future
DWI-offender owners increasingly asserting due process challenges
associated with forfeiture. Using Barker, on the other hand, would have
removed the balancing of private interests from the equation, effectively
avoiding the link between innocent and guilty owners. The court missed the
opportunity afforded by Barker to offer innocent owners an exclusive and
strong claim against unjustified delays in forfeiture hearings. By doing so,
the court has shut the door on using Barker in future forfeiture cases.
Unfortunately, the court has simultaneously opened another door for repeat
DWI offenders to assert their now-recognized, weighty private interest in a
prompt post-seizure hearing. By providing repeat drunk drivers with a
mechanism to return behind the wheel, this decision will likely have
dangerous repercussions.

370

See United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S.
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983).
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